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CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
As might be expected, little has been said during this period
with respect to the substantive elements of a crime. One case,
that of People v. Jones,1 involved an alleged public nuisance in
permitting a well drilled for oil or gas to remain unplugged after
the abandonment thereof.2 The defense was that the action was
barred for failure to initiate proceedings within eighteen months
after the cessation of production. In answer thereto, the court
explained that the acts constituting the public nuisance were not
consummated when the well was abandoned and the nuisance first
appeared but rather continued as long as the well remained uncapped, for it was the conduct of permitting the well to remain
uncapped rather than the original abandonment 'which was the
real subject of the statutory prohibition. It also held that the
law was not rendered invalid as being an ex post facto statute for
each day of omission constituted a new occurrence hence there
was no occasion to consider whether the statute made acts unlawful which were not unlawful at the time they originally took
place. In cases of that character, however, the judgment is limited to the criminal penalty only and may not, according to People
v. Livingston,4 also include an order that the defendant abate the
nuisance. It was, therefore, there held error for a county court
to impose an additional penalty for contempt of court for refusing
to abate the nuisance in question.
Another case which gives content to the substantive definition of a breach of the peace is City of Chicago v. Terminiello5
wherein the defendant was arrested for aiding in the creation of
a riot, disturbance and breach of peace, in violation of a city ordinance,6 by the use of insulting and abusive language in a speech
1329 Il1. App. 503, 69 N. E. (2d) 522 (1946).
2 The prosecution was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 466.
a Ibid., § 631.
4331 II. App. 313, 73 N. E. (2d) 136 (1947).
5 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E. (2d) 45 (1947). Niemeyer, P.J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
6 Mun. Code 1939, Ch. 193, § 1(1).
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given at an alleged public meeting held in the city. 7 Tne defense
argued that the meeting was not a public one; that defendant's
speech was not addressed to the particular persons responsible for
the acts of violence and disturbance; and that the remarks, even
if overheard, could not be deemed the cause of the illegal disturbance because privileged by constitutional guarantees. These
points were considered to be essential elements of the crime
charged, but the court nevertheless held the evidence did not warrant dismissing the charge. With respect to the first point, i.e.,
the public nature of the meeting, it was shown that while admission was by card only the mailing list used to publicize the meeting
was considerably larger than the capacity of the hall and that
each addressee was given several cards of admission with a request to distribute them among friends. The size and composition
of the meeting, the circumstances surrounding admission, the
form of the invitation, and the indiscriminate methods used for
the distribution thereof all combined to give the meeting the characteristics of a public affair. The court also pointed to the
familiar limitation upon the right of free speech to the effect that
the right to speak is relative and does not extend to remarks
known to have, as their natural and inevitable consequence, the
creation of riots and disorder. It felt that the phrasing of the
announcement and defendant's experience at prior meetings must
have made him realize the atmosphere of tension and mob excitement which prevailed at the time so that his remarks not only had
a tendency to capitalize on this atmosphere as an opportunity to
incite others to create a disturbance, but actually constituted a
disturbance per se. s
Most of the significant cases in this field deal with procedural
matters and they are presented in roughly the same order in
7 The facts indicated that defendant, to attend the meeting in question, had to
force his way through a milling crowd which was manifestly hostile; that during
the meeting repeated acts of violence and disturbance occurred both inside and outside of the hall; and that the. defendant replied to these occurrences, both through
his prepared speech and his extemporaneous remarks, with inflammatory and exciting language which heightened the disturbance.
8 The dissenting opinion attempted to work out a solution from common-law definitions of public meetings and of indictable language to support defendant's claims
concerning the private nature of the meeting and the non-inflammatory nature of
his remarks.
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which the problems concerned are likely to arise in the conduct of
a criminal prosecution. For example, one who pleads to an indictment generally waives all right t6 question the validity of the
grand jury which returned that indictment, 9 but the court in
People v. Vincent, 10 despite that rule, nevertheless examined into
the regularity of a petition for the recall of the grand jury" there
concerned and determined that such a petition need not be verified by the state's attorney, signature alone being sufficient. It
was also held that, upon recall, it was not necessary that the grand
12
jury be resworn or reinstructed.
A precise description of the money stolen is a desirable allegation in every indictment for larceny but it is not always possible
to provide an accurate one, hence an allegation that a better description was to the grand jurors unknown is tolerated by reason
of the necessities of the case.13 The decision in People v. Finch, 4
however, seems to go further than most cases on the point for the
court there held that an allegation that "$400 good and legal
money of the United States of the value of $400" was stolen was
sufficient, inasmuch as none of the witnesses could give any exact
description of the denomination of the currency taken, even
though the customary recital that a better description was to the
jurors unknown was omitted from the charge. The use of abbreviations in criminal pleidings in not desirable since confusion is
likely to result. In People v. O'Campo,15 the information charged
the larceny of "Eighty Cents- (50¢-25¢--05¢) U. S. Currency."
It was claimed that such a description was meaningless as the
term "U. S." might refer to any of three well-known countries
beside the United States of America, while the word "currency"
9 Stone v. People, 3 Ill. (2
10394 Il1.

165, 68 N. E.

Scam.)

(2d)

326 (1840).

275 (1946).

11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 713.
12 See also People v. McCauley, 256 Ill. 504, 100 N. E. 182 (1912). In that case,
however, the issue as to whether any new instruction was necessary was not raised.
13 See annotation in 36 L. R. A. (N.S.) 933, particularly pp. 943-4. The making
of such an allegation when the grand jury was, in fact, furnished with an accurate
description constitutes reversible error according to People v. Hunt, 251 Ill. 446,
96 N. E. 220 (1911).
14 394 Ill. 183, 68 N. E. (2d) 283 (1946).
15 330 Ill. App. 401, 71 N. E. (2d) 375 (1947).
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was said to refer to paper money only. The court, however, applying the test of whether the language tended to confuse as to the
nature of the crime, held there was no merit to the objection. An
obvious mistake in substituting the victim's name in place of that
of the defendant, in that part of an indictment for receiving stolen
property which charges the possession of guilty knowledge, was
regarded as reversible error in People v. Harris6 since, after
deleting the mistaken statement, the indictment then lacked an
essential allegation to the charge. Unchallenged inaccuracy in an
indictment may not be enough, but unchallenged inadequacy would
seem to be sufficient to support reversal.
Although the Criminal Code recognizes the right of an accused
person to be represented by counsel, 17 the standard practice in
this state, except in capital cases, has been for the trial court to
take no action with regard thereto unless the defendant requests
such assistance and states on oath that he is unable to procure
counsel., whereupon it becomes the duty of the court to provide the
indigent defendant with competent legal representation. If, after
being duly admonished, an intelligent defendant insists on pleading guilty, there is no occasion for legal representation except,
perhaps, in connection with a hearing as to mitigating factors
which may have bearing on the nature of the punishment to be
imposed. 8 For these reasons, many a writ of error has been
denied and many a conviction affirmed so long as the common-law
record contains proper recitals and the accuracy thereof is not
disputed by a proper bill of exceptions showing a denial of any
fundamental right. There would seem to be an attitude on the
part of certain of the justices of the United States Supreme Court,
however, to insist upon a requirement that no plea of guilty shall
ever be received unless the defendant is represented by, or supplied with, legal counsel and that, in the absence thereof, every
such conviction should be reversed for denial of due process. So
far, a majority of the justices of that court have refused to recede
16394 Il1. 325, 68 N. E. (2d)

728 (1946).

17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 730.
is Ibid., § 732.
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from the holding in Betts v. Brady,19 but the dissenting minority
in two cases coming from Illinois 20 has now reached sufficient size
that a change in the law may be imminent and the time may yet
come when trial judges will owe something more than the "negative duty to sit silent and blind while men go on their way to
'2
prison.., for want of any hint of their rights. A rare factual situation, evoking a decision of first impression in Illinois, was presented in People v. Harrison2 where the
defendant, acquitted on a charge of assault with a deadly weapon,
was nevertheless successfully convicted on a charge of murder
provoked by the subsequent death of the victim of the assault at
a time after'the defendant's acquittal on the original charge but
within a year and a day from the date of the attack. 23 Defendant's
reliance on the plea of double jeopardy was held unwarranted on
the theory that, as the victim was still alive at the time of the
first trial, defendant could in no way have been exposed to the risk
of conviction for murder, hence jeopardy with respect thereto had
never arisen. The case, however, appears to overlook the possibility that the defendant might have relied on a claim of res adjudicata or estoppel by judgment rather than that of double
jeopardy for the former trial, if it established anything, certainly
fixed the fact that defendant either did not engage in the required
criminal act or else was lacking in the requisite criminal intent.
Such a finding would necessarily seem to negative at least one
aspect of the state's case at the later prosecution and, had the
24
issue been presented, might well have led to a reversal.
Civil cases have established the rule that a plaintiff who takes
a voluntary nonsuit may not move to reinstate his case unless
19316 U. S. 455, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942), noted in 21 CHICoAGo-KENT
LAw REvI W 107.
20 Carter v. Illinois, 329 U. S. 173, 67 S. Ct. 216, 91 L. Ed. (adv.)

157 (1946);
Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134, 67 S. Ct. 1716, 91 L. Ed. (adv.) 1542 (1947).
?1 See dissent by Rutledge, J., concurred in by Black, Douglas and Murphy, JJ.,
in Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134 at
, 67 S. Ct. 1716 at 1722, 91 L. Ed. (adv.)
1542 at 1549.
22 395 Il1. 463, 70 N. E. (2d) 596 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RiVIFEw
243, 47 Col. L. Rev. 679.
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 365, reiterates the common-law requirement. That
provision has been criticized in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 181.
24 See a discussion of this point in 25 CHIGAGO-KENT LAW. REVrEw 243 at 245-6.
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suitable reservation is made at the time of dismissal.2 5 Entry of
a nolle prosequi on a criminal charge should, logically, be bound
by the same rule, but the Supreme Court held otherwise in People
v. Watson2 6 when it allowed the prosecution, during the term, to
reinstate a count which had been nolled six days prior thereto
even though the case had proceeded in the meantime to judgment
on the other count. 27 Again, an impelling factor in that result may
have been the failure of the defendant to protest, for the count
did note that while the procedure was deemed legal it was not to
be commended.
Two small points with respect to the trial of criminal cases
might be noticed. Confessions obtained by coercion have been
universally condemned, at least in democratic countries, as improper evidence on which to base a conviction. A new wrinkle
was tried in People v. Sims 28 where the accused, a seventeen-year
old girl, was induced to give a statement to the prosecuting
authorities while harnessed to a lie-detector machine but which
apparatus was not then in operation. It appeared to have been
the contention of the prosecution that, as no lie-detector test was
in progress, the statement was freely and voluntarily made. Admission thereof was treated as error when the Supreme Court
expressed the belief that it was impossible to say that the girl
was not influenced to some degree by the fact that the apparatus
was attached to her body. The decision was further strengthened
by the fact that the accused had protested against being subjected
to any test whatever without first consulting counsel. Alibi witnesses who testify on behalf of the defendant, like any other
witnesses, may be impeached by proof of bad reputation. The
case of People v. Boulhanis,29 however, would indicate that such
impeachment may not be attempted by asking such witnesses, on
cross-examination, if they had been subpoenaed before the grand
25 See Fulton v. Yondorf, 324 Ill. App. 452, 58 N. E. (2d)
CHICAGO.-KENT LAW REvEww 327.

640 (1944), noted in 23

26394 Ill. 177, 68 N. E. (2d) 265 (1946), noted in 25 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW RviEw 246.
27 In People v. Caponetto, 359 I1. 41, 194 N. E. 231 (1934), the reinstatement
occurred during the course of the trial on the other counts.
28395 Ill. 69, 69 N. E. (2d) 336 (1946).
29394
Ill. 255, 68 N. E. (2d) 467 (1946).
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jury but had refused to answer questions propounded to them by
the grand jury. Such a line of interrogation would seem designed
to develop little more than immaterial matter but the court regarded the questioning as prejudicial enough to warrant reversal.
Care should be exercised in recording the judgment for while
there is no doubt that the record of conviction in a criminal case
may be amended by a nunc pro tunc order to correct a clerical
error, 30 any such amendment should occur only after notice to
the defendantA1 It was urged, in People v. Wos, 32 that notice of
an application for such an order served on the counsel who had
represented the defendant at the original trial was sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the law. The Supreme Court, however, following the general rule that an attorney's relation with
his client generally ceases upon rendition of the judgment and the
satisfaction thereof, 33 regarded such notice as invalid and any
amendment based thereon equally a nullity. It would seem, therefore that if notice is to be given to the defendant in person, especially while undergoing incarceration, the trial court should also
cause a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandur to issue in order
that the defendant may appear and contest the application.
The nature of the proper sentence to be imposed has been
made the subject of several decisions for the changes made in
the Habitual Criminal Act 34 seem to have produced considerable
confusion. In People v. Perkins,3 5 for example, the defendant
successfully contended that a sentence to confinement in the reformatory rather than the penitentiary, 36 pronounced prior to
the consolidation of all such institutions into one penitentiary
system,3 7 could not be relied upon to support a sentence as an
30 Kennedy v. People, 44 Inl. 283 (1867).
31 People v. Friedman, 223 Il1. App. 149 (1921).
32 395 Il1.
172, 69 N. E. (2d) 858 (1946).

33 See 7 C. J. S., Attorney and Client, § 108; 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 102.
34 The present statute is to be found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 602 et seq.
There have been three revisions since the statute was first adopted in 1883.
35 395 Il1. 553, 70 N. E. (2d) 622 (1947). Stone, J., and Thompson, J., concurred
Rn the result but not in the interpretation given to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38,
§609.
36 Such sentence was proper, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 803, because of
the age of the offender.
37 Laws 1933, p. 780; I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 108, § 105.
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habitual offender. The court distinguished between the situation
before it and that presented where the defendant was sentenced
to the penitentiary but admitted to probation, 38 although it noted,
by way of dictum, that since 1941 actual imprisonment was essential. 3 9 The dictum referred to was translated into decision when
the court was called upon to review the conviction in People v.
Hall4 0 for it there held that, under present law, an averment of
imprisonment in the penitentiary is an essential allegation to
support a charge of being an habitual criminal.
Absence of any specific statement in the Habitual Criminal
Act that the former conviction had to be one pronounced by this
state did not prevent the court, in People v. Poppe,4 1 from drawing an inference that the legislature intended the severer penalty
to apply to the recidivist regardless where the earlier conviction
was obtained, whether in or out of the state. That inference was
believed aided by the fact that proof of the prior conviction must
be made by a "duly authenticated copy" thereof 42 whereas a
simple certified copy would have been sufficient to establish the
existence of any local judgment. 43 Whether rightly or wrongly
decided, 44 the doctrine of that case was followed in People v.
Gavalis45 where the prior conviction was secured in a federal
court, although the opinion therein does not disclose whether the
federal court in question was sitting in Illinois or not. There
must not only be an adequate charge and adequate proof of the
prior conviction but, according to People v. Berger,46 the prosecution must also obtain a verdict expressly finding the existence of
the precise prior conviction charged to support the judgment that
38 Heretofore, the last mentioned fact did not prevent a subsequent charge as an
habitual criminal: People v. Andrae, 295 i1. 445, 129 N. E. 178 (1920); People v.
Tierney, 250 Ill. 515, 95 N. E. 447 (1911).
39 Laws 1941, p. 573; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 602.
40397 Ill. 134, 73 N. E. (2d) 405 (1947).
41394 Ill. 216, 68 N. E. (2d) 254 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RE vI w 157.

42 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 603.
43 Ibid, Ch. 51, § 13.
44 See comment in 25 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvEw 157, particularly pp. 161-2.
45 395 Ill. 409, 70 N. E. (2d) 589 (1947).
46 396 Ill. 97, 71 N. E. (2d) 6 (1947).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

the accused, as an habitual criminal, should serve the more severe
penalty. Thus an indictment charging a prior conviction for
grand larceny is not sustained by a verdict finding that the defendant had previously been convicted simply of "larceny"47
since the statute does not contemplate that an earlier conviction
for petit larceny will be enough. There does, however, seem to
be some misnomer in the term "habitual criminal," judging by
the holding in People v. Flaherty,48 for it was there deemed proper
for the state to rely on an earlier conviction as support for its
claim that defendant was an habitual offender even though such
prior conviction had been secured twenty-three years before the
present offense. Defendant's argument that the absence of criminal tendencies throughout so long a period hardly justified treating him as a regular or frequent criminal was rejected on the
basis that the statute possesses mandatory character and does
49
not require that the defendant be, in fact, a confirmed recidivist.
The scope and nature of the review available in criminal cases
also received consideration. Two points of interest were determined in Jablonski v. People"0 wherein a petition in the nature of
a writ of error coram nobis was presented nearly sixteen years
after judgment by a sister of the convicted person, acting as his
next friend. She sought vacation of the sentence on the ground
that the defendant, at the time of the trial, was and had been
adjudged to be a feeble-minded person which fact had not been
disclosed to the trial court. 51 The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that (a) only the convicted person could apply
for relief,5 2 and (b) the time for presentation thereof had long
47 A distinction was drawn as to the holding in People v. Tierney, 250 il. 515,
95 N. E. 447 (1911), by pointing out that in that case the jury found the fact
of prior conviction for robbery but failed to specify the date thereof. The omission
was deemed cured by reference to the charge.
48 393 Ill. 304, 71 N. E. (2d) 779 (1947).
49 The term "habitual criminal" does not appear in the text of Ill. Rev. Stat.
1947, Ch. 38, § 602, and is merely added by the publishers of the statute book as a
convenient catch-word title.
50 330 Ill. App. 422, 71 N. E. (2d) 361 (1947).
51 The justifiable grounds for such a petition are set out in People v. Ogdin, 368
I1. 173, 13 N. E. (2d) 162 (1938).
52 Such was the holding in People v. Nakielny, 279 Ill. App. 387 (1935), but it
does not appear that the defendant there concerned was mentally incompetent.
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since expired.5 The decision was reversed when the Appellate
Court for the First District concluded first that, in the absence of
a duly appointed conservator or guardian, the petition could
properly come from either a self-appointed next friend or some
court appointed representative, and second, that the limitation
period does not run during the continuance of a defendant's mental disability.5 4 Any doubt that proceedings of this character are
constitutional when applied to criminal cases 55 has been removed
by the decision in People v. Touhy 56 which case also provides a
complete account of the historical developments underlying the
present statute. The fact that it is too late to present such a
petition may, according to United States v. Ragen,57 be an excuse
for seeking habeas corpus in the federal tribunals without first
exhausting state remedies.
The clear language of the Probation Act directs that review
of an order revoking or terminating a probation order shall be
granted by the appropriate Appellate Court" even though the
original conviction be for a felony and reviewable, if at all, by the
state Supreme Court. 59 The writ of error issued by the Supreme
Court in People v. Bruno6" to review an order revoking probation
was, accordingly, transferred to the proper Appellate Court because the court issuing the writ was entirely without jurisdiction
to pass on the question. Care should be taken to avoid confusion,
for the review granted by the Supreme Court in People v. Catcott,0' while not requested until after probation was revoked,
actually constituted a review of the original judgment and not
of the order revoking probation.
Further proceedings in the trial court may become necessary
after review has been given and mandate issued. The unfortunate
53 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Oh. 110, § 196, places a five-year limitation on proceedings
of this character.
54 Ibid., Ch. 83, § 22.
55 See 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Rwmrw 45-6, particularly note 31.
56 397 Ill. 19, 72 N. E. (2d) 827 (1947).
57 158 F. (2d) 346 (1947).
58 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 798.
.
59 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 780
60 395 Ill. 382, 69 N. E. (2d) 898 (1946).
61393 Ill. 582, 67 N. E. (2d) 175 (1946).
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amendments made in 1941 to the Sentence and Parole Act purporting to authorize an advisory recommendation as to the length of
incarceration3 2 were declared unconstitutional in People v. Montana6 3 but not soon enough to prevent the rendition of many
sentences containing advisory recommendations. Upon writ of
error, many such sentences have been reversed and cases have
been remanded with direction to enter sentence in confornity with
law, the defendant being given an election to apply for sentence
under the statute as it existed prior to the attempted reform6 4 or
as amended by changes adopted in 1943.65 The result of such
reversal, according to People ex rel. Barrett v. Bardens,66 is not
to reopen the case to the point where the defendant might apply
for probation but is confined to the single purpose of entering a
new and valid judgment. For that reason, an original proceeding
in mandamus was entertained and a peremptory writ was granted
to compel the trial judge to expunge an order granting probation
after reversal on the ground that such action was contrary to the
mandate issued under the writ of error.
There has been very little modification of statutory law, perhaps against the possibility that the legislature may yet undertake
to revise the whole Criminal Code. The section dealing with
burning of lands, fields and crops has been recast ;67 the duplication produced by two statutes dealing with conspiracy to boycott
and blacklist has been eliminated ;68 the section concerning derogatory remarks reflecting upon the financial condition of banks has
been enlarged to cover federal savings and loan associations as
62 Laws 1941, p. 560; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 38, § 801 et seq.
63 380 Ill. 596, 44 N. E. (2d) 569 (1942).
64 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 801 et seq.
65 Laws 1943, Vol. 1, p. 591; 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 801 et seq. The 1943
amendments were again held constitutional in People v. Burnett, 394 Ill. 420.
68 N. E. (2d) 733 (1946), against the contention that they improperly modified
the express provisions of the Criminal Code prescribing specific punishments for
enumerated crimes. See also People v. Roche, 389 Ill. 361, 59 N. E. (2d) 866 (1945).
lf the defendant chooses the benefit of the 1943 amendments, he loses credit for the
time already spent in the penitentiary: People v. Wilson, 391 Ill. 463, 63 N. E.
(2d) 488 (1945).
66 394 Il. 511, 68 N. E.

(2d) 710 (1946).

67 Laws 1947, p. 798, H. B. 273: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947. Ch. 38. 1 53.
68 Laws 1947, p. 799, H. B. 221; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 139.
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well;69 and the language declaring it to be disorderly conduct to
"carry concealed weapons" has been deleted 0 apparently in order
to insure prosecution under another provision which carries higher
penalties. 71 In addition thereto, certain barbiturate compounds
having hypnotic or somnifacient action have been added to the list
of drugs which may not be sold except on proper prescription ;72
and it is now criminal to solicit funds under a false name or by
using the true name of another without first obtaining written
permission, 73 to make improper use of the insignia of still another
veterans' organization,7 4 or to become involved in bribery over
sporting events particularly with a view to limiting a player's
own, or his team's, scoring ability or the margin by which victory
is achieved. 7" The only change in procedural matters has been to
finally delete the one-hundred rod provision relating to jurisdiction over offenses committed on county lines, a clause that has remained in the statute book although declared unconstitutional over
sixty years ago, 76 and to remove the provision from the extradition statute which purported to allow the court to inquire into
the good faith of the demanding state.7 7 There has, however, been
some amelioration in the law both with respect to the means by
which habitual offenders may be paroled7 8 and also concerning the
possibility of probation for persons who would not otherwise be
79
entitled thereto.

69 Laws 1947, p. 801, H. B. 566; Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 405.
70 Laws 1947, p. 799, H. B. 222; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 160.
71 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 155.
72 Laws 1947, p. 802, H. B. 67; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 186c.
73 Laws 1947, p. 811, S. B. 118; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 254.1.

74 Laws 1947, p. 813, H. B. 817; Il.

Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 269c.

75 Laws 1947, p. 811, S. B. 18; Ini. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, §§ 83a-83c.
76 Laws 1947, p. 798, H. B. 220; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 704.
v. People, 110 Ill. 29 (1884).

77 Laws 1947, p. 1038, H. B. 213 II.

See Buckrice

Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 60. § 2.

See also

People ex rel. Carr v. Murray, 357 Ill. 326, 192 N. E. 198, 94 A. L. R. 1487 (1934),

noted in 13 CHICAGo-KENT REvIEw 86.
78 Laws 1947, p. 808, S. B. 350; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 801.1.

79 Laws 1947, p. 806, H. B. 867; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 785.
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V.

FAMILY LAW

Final nullification of the so-called "Heart Balm" Act 1 occurred during the past year through the decision in Heck v.
SchUpp, 2 an action for alienation of affections.8 The primary
ground relied upoq was the same one previously pointed out,
to-wit: the content of the statute was not fairly revealed in the
title, 4 but the court also adverted to the fact that the statute would
serve to put a premium on violations of moral law for offenders
would be free to pursue a course of conduct without fear of
punishment, hence also violated that part of the Bill of Rights
guaranteeing a "certain remedy" in the laws for all injuries
and wrongs. 5 Legislature response to the decision may be observed
in three new statutes restricting damages in civil actions for
alienation of affections, 6 for breach of promise to marry,7 and
for criminal conversation" to the actual damages sustained. No
punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages are hereafter to be
allowed. In the case of suits for breach of promise to marry, the
plaintiff must also serve notice of intention to sue within three
months of the alleged breach and then bring the action within one
year. 9
Paralleling the decision in the case last mentioned is the
holding of the Appellate Court for the Second District in Johnson
v. Luhman' ° wherein a complaint by a minor to recover damages
for alienation of the parent's affections was held to state a cause
of action despite the objection that the infant's claim was a novel
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 38, § 246.1 et seq.
2394 Ill. 296, 68 N. E. (2d) 464 (1946), noted in 47 Col. L. Rev. 503, 42 Ill.
L. Rev. 233.
3 See also Zaremba v. Skurdialis, 395 Ill. 437, 70 N. E. (2d) 617 (1947). Other
portions of the statute had been declared unconstitutional in People v. Mahumed,
681 I1. 81, 44 N. E. (2d) 911 (1942).
4 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
5 Ibid., Art. II, § 19.
6 Laws 1947, p. 796, S. B. 562; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 68, § 34 et seq.
7 Laws 1947, p. 1181, S. B. 563; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 89, § 25 et seq.
8 Laws 1947, p. 800, S. B. 552; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 68, § 41 et seq.
9 The contents of the notice are specified in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 89, § 28.
10 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. E. (2d) 810 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGo-KENT L&w
REvIEw 260 and 36 Il. B. J. 84.

